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Fiduciary and Nonfiduciary Duties
Roger Bernhardt

Introduction
Two decisions reported in this issue inevitably invite comparison. In Saffie v Schmeling (2014) 224 CA4th 563,
announced by the Fourth District on March 17 and reported on p 68, a buyer who discovered that he could not build
on the property that he had just purchased sued the listing and showing brokers for providing him with an optimistic
1982 earthquake fault hazard investigation report (the “earthquake” report) without also saying that the report had
become unreliable after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, so that what he thought was a buildable lot was not, and he
would have to spend more money than it was worth on geological investigations to make the lot buildable. He
prevailed against his own showing broker (who did not appeal), but he lost against the listing broker, in both the trial
and appellate courts, on the ground that his loss was due entirely to his own showing broker’s failure as a fiduciary
and not to anything done wrong by the listing broker.
On the other hand, on April 9, in Horiik e v Coldwell Bank er Residential Brok erage Co. (2014) 225 CA4th 427,
reported on p 68, the Second District ruled that a listing salesperson, as a fiduciary, could be liable for misdescribing
the acreage of the property sold, even though he himself was representing only the seller, not the buyer. That
conclusion was based on the fact that the two salespersons involved worked under the single broker’s license of
Coldwell Banker (CB), which meant that the relationship between CB and the principals was a dual agency, and that
dual agency characterization applied to each of the two salespersons individually. That meant that the listing
salesperson owed to the buyer fiduciary obligations and not just ordinary nonfiduciary duties, even though he thought
(and said on the agency confirmation sheet) that he was representing only the seller.
So we have one case—Saffie—holding that a listing salesperson is not a fiduciary of the buyer (and therefore not
liable for fiduciary breaches), and another—Horiik e—saying that the listing salesperson there was a fiduciary (with
potential fiduciary liability to him). I’ll call Horiik e the profiduciary case and Saffie the nonfiduciary one.
Fiduciary to One Side or Both?
In Saffie, although not stated explicitly, no fiduciary relationship between the listing salesperson and the buyer was
found to exist because the salesperson worked for a broker who was the agent of only the seller, whereas the
salesperson in Horiik e was held to be fiduciary because he worked for the broker who also represented the buyer—
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albeit through a different salesperson. It was the dual agency feature of Horiik e that made the listing broker a fiduciary
of the buyer, a feature that was not present in Saffie, making that listing salesperson not a fiduciary of the buyer.
The Horiik e conclusions of dual agency when a single house represents both principals, and dual agency
responsibilities that trickle down to both salespersons despite what they think, are rather inarguable, in light of CC
§2079.13(b), which says just that. If the broker (Coldwell Banker) was a dual agent because it represented both seller
and buyer, then each salesperson was also a dual agent even though he may have thought that he represented only
one principal.
The nature of the broker-principal relationship matters because our statutes impose different burdens on fiduciary and
nonfiduciary real estate agents. Under CC §2079.16, a real estate agent who is a fiduciary to only one side owes that
principal the duties of “utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty,” whereas she owes the other, nonfiduciary
principal “diligent exercise of reasonable skill and care,” “honest and fair dealing and good faith,” and a “duty to
disclose all facts” known to her that materially affect value. (From now on, I’ll refer to an agent with fiduciary
obligations as “he” and to an agent with only nonfiduciary duties as “she.”)
When these statutory standards and distinctions first came into existence, I thought that they were impossible. In my
column Brok er’s Agency Disclosure Law: Misinformation or Disinformation?, 11 CEB RPLR 113 (July 1988) (findable
on my website, RogerBernhardt.com), I challenged the possibility of brokers being able to sensibly explain to their
clients the differences between their fiduciary obligations of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty, and their
general duties of reasonable skill and care, honesty, fair dealing, good faith, and disclosure of all material facts, not
because I thought that the brokers were incompetent or inarticulate, but because those statutory phrases looked to
me like nothing but contradictory cliches, not comprehensible to clients and brokers (or jurors if a dispute gets to
trial). (Even the California Association of Realtors (CAR), sponsor of the legislation, got it wrong, referring to the
fiduciary category as including “loyalty, obedience, disclosure, confidentiality, reasonable care and diligence, and
accounting” (Compliance Manual p 25, Answer 3), thus hopelessly blurring its own distinctions.) So my question is
now whether these two decisions make the fiduciary/general distinction any easier to deal with.
Fiduciary vs Nonfiduciary Duties
In Saffie, the court held that it was the duty of the buyer’s broker, as a fiduciary, to further investigate the reliability of
the earthquake report and to appropriately caution the buyer about it. But, as far as the nonfiduciary listing
salesperson was concerned, providing the buyer with a copy of the earthquake report fully satisfied his duty of
“honesty, fairness and full disclosure.” So there is a distinction that can be comprehended: A nonfiduciary agent has
only a general duty to not furnish false or incomplete information; she does not have to “make certain that the buyer
and the buyer’s broker perform the appropriate due diligence” regarding the information she has furnished. On the
other hand, a fiduciary agent has the greater duty of assuring that his principal appreciates the significance of the
information provided. Because the injury to this buyer resulted from a failure of his own agent to investigate and
understand the implications of the earthquake report, he—the showing agent—was the one who would be liable to the
buyer. The distinction between fiduciary and nonfiduciary duties did seem to be understandable, contrary to my
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prediction when the agency disclosure statutes were enacted.
Horiik e triggers a different reaction in me on that question. After the court of appeal ruled that the trial court had been
wrong in holding that the listing salesperson was not a fiduciary to the buyer, the case needed to be remanded to
have the jury decide whether that salesperson, and his broker, were liable for fiduciary breaches. The previous jury
had already found that the listing salesperson was not liable for negligently misrepresenting the square footage
because he honestly and reasonably believed that it was correct, but that finding had been made under the auspices
of the trial court’s erroneous determination that he was not a fiduciary of the buyer. The appellate court said that,
under those circumstances, that jury finding did not dispose of the question of whether the salesperson fulfilled his
obligation as a fiduciary to learn all the necessary material facts, to do all the necessary research and investigation,
and to give good counsel and advice; because he knew that conflicting measurements as to this property existed, a
new jury could find that he breached his fiduciary obligation to the buyer to give this information to him. Constructive
fraud by a fiduciary is different from negligence or negligent misrepresentation by a nonfiduciary.
The logic in Horiik e is unclear to me. Would not even a nonfiduciary agent who was aware of conflicting
measurements have a duty to speak out, under his general duty to disclose all material facts? Perhaps my earlier
prediction about people getting mixed up about appreciating the distinction between fiduciary and nonfiduciary duties
was not misguided, except that I should have included appellate judges, as well as jurors and brokers and principals
as those who might suffer the confusion.
Being a Fiduciary to Rival Principals
But whether or not Horiik e’s ultimate conclusion is correct—that the listing salesperson may have failed to perform
the fiduciary duties that he owed to the buyer—the court’s process of getting to that issue was surely proper. An
agent can be a fiduciary or nonfiduciary, a dual agent will be held to be a fiduciary to both, and each subagent of a
dual agent is to be treated the same way. That means that there is no way for a broker who wants to earn a full rather
than half a commission (and therefore has to be a dual agent) to lessen her duties to either principal. Conflicting
fiduciary obligations are the cost imposed on choosing dual agency, and I doubt that any clever language in the
documents or bureaucratic structure in the office can change that.
These dual agency conclusions did not have to be that way. The legislation could have provided that rival subagents
at the same house could get themselves treated differently from each other, by erecting appropriate barriers between
them. In fact, had we allowed that arrangement, clients would probably have been better served through allowing each
separate agent not to worry about fiduciary obligations to the other side interfering with those owed to her separate
principal. That might have forced the system to treat brokers as different from their salespersons, but in larger
brokerage houses, the broker’s liability is more often based on the principle of respondeat superior than on the
commission of any bad acts that he/she has done personally. In any event, that is not our current rule, so it is all
wishful thinking by me.
The broker industry likes the concept of dual agency, so as to make larger commissions possible. But the price of
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dual agency is dual fiduciary obligations, which are intrinsically dangerous. Its combination with the barely
comprehensible distinction between fiduciary and nonfiduciary duties makes these issues fodder for a field day for
trial lawyers.

37 Real Property Law Reporter No. 3 (Cal CEB May 2014), © The Regents of the University of California,
reprinted with permission of CEB.
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